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Abstract
This paper introduces a model based upon games on an evolving network, and
develops three clustering algorithms according to it. In the clustering algorithms,
data points for clustering are regarded as players who can make decisions in games.
On the network describing relationships among data points, an edge-removing-
and-rewiring (ERR) function is employed to explore in a neighborhood of a data
point, which removes edges connecting to neighbors with small payoffs, and cre-
ates new edges to neighbors with larger payoffs. As such, the connections among
data points vary over time. During the evolution of network, some strategies are
spread in the network. As a consequence, clusters are formed automatically, in
which data points with the same evolutionarily stable strategy are collected as a
cluster, so the number of evolutionarily stable strategies indicates the number of
clusters. Moreover, the experimental results have demonstrated that data points
in datasets are clustered reasonably and efficiently, and the comparison with other
algorithms also provides an indication of the effectiveness of the proposed algo-
rithms.
Keywords: Unsupervised learning, data clustering, evolutionary game theory, evo-
lutionarily stable strategy
1 Introduction
Cluster analysis is an important branch of Pattern Recognition, which is widely used
in many fields such as pattern analysis, data mining, information retrieval and image
segmentation. For the past thirty years, many excellent clustering algorithms have
been presented, say, K-means [1], C4.5 [2], support vector clustering (SVC) [3], spec-
tral clustering [4], etc., in which the data points for clustering are fixed, and various
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functions are designed to find separating hyperplanes. In recent years, however, a sig-
nificant change has been made. Some researchers thought about that why not those data
points could move by themselves, just like agents or something, and collect together
automatically. Therefore, following their ideas, they created a few exciting algorithms
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9], in which data points move in space according to certain simple local
rules preset in advance.
Game theory came into being with the book named ”Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior” by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern [10] in 1940. In this
period, Cooperative Game was widely studied. Till 1950’s, John Nash published two
well-known papers to present the theory of non-cooperative game, in which he pro-
posed the concept of Nash equilibrium, and proved the existence of equilibrium in a
finite non-cooperative game [11, 12]. Although non-cooperative game was established
on the rigorous mathematics, it required that players in a game must be perfect ratio-
nal or even hyper-rational. If this assumption could not hold, the Nash equilibrium
might not be reached sometimes. On the other hand, evolutionary game theory [13]
stems from the researches in biology which are to analyze the conflict and coopera-
tion between animals or plants. It differs from classical game theory by focusing on
the dynamics of strategy change more than the properties of strategy equilibria, and
does not require perfect rational players. Besides, an important concept, evolutionarily
stable strategy [13, 14], in evolutionary game theory was defined and introduced by
John Maynard Smith and George R. Price in 1973, which was often used to explain the
evolution of social behavior in animals.
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of data clustering has not been investi-
gated based on evolutionary game theory. So, if data points in a dataset are considered
as players in games, could clusters be formed automatically by playing games among
them? This is the question that we attempt to answer. In our clustering algorithm, each
player hopes to maximize his own payoff, so he constantly adjusts his strategies by
observing neighbors’ payoffs. In the course of strategies evolving, some strategies are
spread in the network of players. Finally, some parts will be formed automatically in
each of which the same strategy is used. According to different strategies played, data
points in the dataset can be naturally collected as several different clusters. The remain-
der of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some basic concepts and
methods about the evolutionary game theory and evolutionary game on graph. In Sec-
tion 3, the model based upon games on evolving network is proposed and described
specifically. Section 4 gives three algorithms based on this model, and the algorithms
are elaborated and analyzed in detail. Section 5 introduces those datasets used in the
experiments briefly, and then demonstrates experimental results of the algorithms. Fur-
ther, the relationship between the number of clusters and the number of nearest neigh-
bors is discussed, and three edge-removing-and-rewiring (ERR) functions employed in
the clustering algorithms are compared. The conclusion is given in Section 6.
2 Related work
Cooperation is commonly observed in genomes, cells, multi-cellular organisms, social
insects, and human society, but Darwin’s Theory of Evolution implies fierce compe-
tition for existence among selfish and unrelated individuals. In past decades, many
efforts have been devoted to understanding the mechanisms behind the emergence and
maintenance of cooperation in the context of evolutionary game theory.
Evolutionary game theory, which combines the traditional game theory with the
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idea of evolution, is based on the assumption of bounded rationality. On the contrary,
in classical game theory players are supposed to be perfectly rational or hyper-rational,
and always choose optimal strategies in complex environments. Finite information and
cognitive limitations, however, often make rational decisions inaccessible. Besides,
perfect rationality may cause the so-called backward induction paradox [15] in finitely
repeated games. On the other hand, as the relaxation of perfect rationality in classi-
cal game theory, bounded rationality means people in games need only part rationality
[16], which explains why in many cases people respond or play instinctively according
to heuristic rules and social norms rather than adopting the strategies indicated by ra-
tional game theory [17]. So, various dynamic rules can be defined to characterize the
boundedly rational behavior of players in evolutionary game theory.
Evolutionary stability is a central concept in evolutionary game theory. In biologi-
cal situations the evolutionary stability provides a robust criterion for strategies against
natural selection. Furthermore, it also means that any small group of individuals who
tries some alternative strategies gets lower payoffs than those who stick to the original
strategy [18]. Suppose that individuals in an infinite and homogenous population who
play symmetric games with equal probability are randomly matched and all employ
the same strategy A. Nevertheless, if a small group of mutants with population share
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) who plays some other strategy appear in the whole group of individuals,
they will receive lower payoffs. Therefore, the strategy A is said to be evolutionary
stable for any mutant strategy B, if and only if the inequality, E(A, (1 − ǫ)A + ǫB) >
E(B, (1 − ǫ)A + ǫB), holds, where the function E(·, ·) denotes the payoff for playing
strategy A against strategy B [19].
In addition, the cooperation mechanism and spatial-temporal dynamics related to it
have long been investigated within the framework of evolutionary game theory based
on the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game or snowdrift game which models interactions
between a pair of players. In early days, the iterated PD game was widely studied, in
which a player interacted with all other players. By round robin interactions among
players, strategies in the population began to evolve according to their payoffs. As a re-
sult, the strategy of unconditional defection was always evolutionary stable [20] while
pure cooperators could not survive. Nevertheless, the Tit-for-Tat strategy is evolution-
ary stable as well, which promotes cooperation based on reciprocity [21].
Recently, evolutionary dynamics in structured populations has attracted much at-
tention, where the structured population denotes an infinite and well-mixed population
which simplifies the analytical description of the evolution process. In real populations,
individuals are more likely affected by their neighbors than those who are far away, but
the spatial structure of population is omitted in the iterated PD game. To study the
spatial effects upon strategy frequencies in the population, Nowak and May [22] have
introduced the spatial PD game, in which players are located on the vertices of a two-
dimensional lattice, whose edges represent connections among the corresponding play-
ers. Instead of playing with all other contestants, each player only interacts with his
neighbors. Without any strategic complexity the stable coexistence of cooperators and
defectors can be achieved. However, the model presented in [22] assumes a noise free
environment. To characterize the effect of noise, Szabo´ and Toke [23] have presented
a stochastic update rule that permits irrational choice. Besides, Perc and Szolnoki [24]
account for social diversity by stochastic variables that determine the mapping of game
payoffs to individual fitness. Furthermore, many other works centered on the lattice
structure have also been done. For example, Vukov and Szabo´ [25] have presented
a hierarchical lattice and shown that for different hierarchical levels the highest fre-
quency of cooperators may occur at the top or middle layer. For more details about
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evolutionary games on graphs, see [17, 26, 27] and references therein.
Yet, as imitations of real social networks, the evolutionary game on lattices assumes
that there is a fixed neighborhood for each player. Nevertheless, this assumption does
not always hold for most of real social networks. Unlike models mentioned above, the
relationships among players (data points) in our model are represented by a weighted
and directed network, which means that players are not located on a regular lattice any
more. And the network will evolve over time because each player is allowed to apply
an edges-removing-and-rewiring (ERR) function to change his connections between
him and his neighbors. Furthermore, the payoff matrix of any two players in the pro-
posed model is also time-varying instead of a constant payoff matrix, for instance, the
payoff matrix in PD game. As a consequence, when the evolutionarily stable strate-
gies emerge in the network, it will be observed that only a few players (data points)
receive considerable connections, while most of them have only one connection. Nat-
urally, players (data points) are divided into several parts (clusters) according to their
evolutionarily stable strategies.
3 Proposed model
Assume a set X with N players, X = {X1,X2, · · · ,XN}, which are distributed in a
m-dimensional metric space. In this metric space, there is a distance function d :
X × X −→ R, which satisfies the condition that the closer any two players are, the
smaller the output is. Based on the distance function a distance matrix is computed
whose entries are distances between any two players. Next, a weighted and directed
k-nearest neighbor (knn) network, G0(X, E0, d), is formed by adding k edges directed
toward its k nearest neighbors for each player, which represents the initial relationships
among all players.
Definition 1 If there is a set X with N players, X = {X1,X2, · · · ,XN }, the initial
weighted and directed knn network, G0(X, E0, d), is created as below.
X =
{
Xi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N
}
E0 =
⋃N
i=1 E0(i)
E0(i) =
{
e0
(
Xi,X j
)
| j ∈ Γ0(i)
}
Γ0(i) =
{
j
∣∣∣∣ j = argmink
Xh∈X
({
d(Xi,Xh),Xh ∈ X
})}
(1)
Here, players in the set X correspond to vertexes in the network G0(X, E0, d); directed
edges in the network represent certain relationships established among players and the
distances denote the weights over edges; the function, argmink(·), is to find k nearest
neighbors of a player, which construct a neighbor set, Γ0(i).
It is worth noting that the distance between a player Xi and himself, d(Xi,Xi), is
zero according to the defined distance function, which means that at the beginning he is
one of his k nearest neighbors. So there is an edge between the player Xi and himself,
namely a self-loop. In practice, the distance is set by d(Xi,Xi) = 1.
When the initial network G0 is established, we can define a evolutionary game,
Ω = {X,G0, S 0,U0}, on it further.
Definition 2 An evolutionary game Ω = {X,G0, S 0,U0} on a network G0 is a 4-
tuple: X is a set of players; G0 represents the initial relationships among players;
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S 0 = {s0(i), i = 1, 2, · · · , N} represents a set of players’ strategies; U0 = {u0(i), i =
1, 2, · · · , N} represents a set of players’ payoffs. In each round, players choose theirs
strategies simultaneously, and each player can only observe its neighbors’ payoffs, but
does not know the strategy profile of anyone of all other players in X. Finally, all
players update their strategy profiles synchronously.
In the proposed model, assume each player in X sets up a group, and hopes to
maximize the payoff of his own group in order to attract more players to join. At the
same time, he also joins k groups set up by other players, so the initial strategy set
s0(i) ∈ S 0 of a player Xi is defined as his neighbor set, s0(i) = Γ0(i). However, it is
worth noting that his preference to join each group is changeable, whose initial value
is given below,
P0(i) =
{
p0(i, j), j ∈ Γ0(i)
}
p0(i, j) = 1/
∣∣∣Γ0(i)∣∣∣ = 1/k (2)
where P0(i) is the preference set, and the symbol | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
Thus, a player’s payoff may be defined as follows.
Definition 3 After a player Xi chooses his strategies and corresponding preferences,
he receives a payoff u0(i),
u0(i) = ∑ j∈Γ0(i) R(i, j)
R(i, j) = p0(i, j) × Deg0( j)/d(Xi,X j)
(3)
where Deg0( j) represents the degree of a player X j in the neighbor set, and the degree
is a sum of the indegree and outdegree.
When all players have received their payoffs, each one will check his neighbors’
payoffs, and apply an ERR function Bi(·) to change his connections and update his
neighbor set.
Definition 4 The ERR function Bi(·) is a function of payoffs, whose output is a set with
k elements, i.e., an updated neighbor set Γ1(i) of a player Xi.
Γ1(i) = Bi(̂u0(i)) = argmaxk
j∈Γ0(i)⋃Υ0(i)
({
u0( j), j ∈ Γ0(i)⋃Υ0(i)})
û0(i) =
{
u0( j), j ∈ Γ0(i)⋃Υ0(i)},Υ0(i) = ⋃ j∈Γ+0 (i) Γ0( j)
Γ+0 (i) =
{
j|u0( j) ≥ θ0(i), j ∈ Γ0(i)
}
, Γ−0 (i) = Γ0(i)\Γ+0 (i)
(4)
where θ0(i) is a payoff threshold, Υ0(i) is called an extended neighbor set, and the
function argmaxk(·) is to find k neighbors with the first to the k-th largest payoffs in the
union Γ0(i)⋃Υ0(i).
The ERR function Bi(·) expands the view of a player Xi, and makes him able to
observe payoffs of players in the extended neighbor set, which provides a chance to find
players with higher payoffs around him. If no players with higher payoffs are found in
the extended neighbor set, i.e., min({u0( j), j ∈ Γ0(i)}) ≥ max({u0(h), h ∈ Υ0(i)}), then
the output of the ERR function is Γ1(i) = Bi(̂u0(i)) = Γ0(i). Otherwise, a neighbor with
the minimal payoff will be removed together with the corresponding edge from the
neighbor set and the edge set, and replaced by a found player with larger payoff. This
process is repeated till the payoffs of unconnected players in the extended neighbor set
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are no larger than those of connected neighbors. Since the connections among players,
namely the edge set E0 in the network G0(X, E0, d), are changed by the ERR function,
the network Gt(X, Et, d) will begin to evolve over time, when t ≥ 1. As such, after
the ERR function is applied, the new preference set Pt(i) of a player Xi needs to be
adjusted.
Definition 5 The new preference set of a player Xi ∈ X is formed by means of the
below formulation.
Pt(i) =
{
pt(i, j), j ∈ Γt(i)
}
pt(i, j) =

∑
h∈(Γt−1(i)\∆) pt−1(i,h)∣∣∣Γt(i)\∆∣∣∣ if j ∈ Γt(i)\∆
pt−1(i, j) otherwise
∆ =
{
Γt−1(i)⋂Γt(i)}
(5)
Then, the player adjusts his preference set Pt(i) as follows. First, he identifies the
neighbor Xm with maximal payoff in his neighbor set,
m = argmax
j∈Γt(i)
({
ut−1( j), j ∈ Γt(i)}) (6)
Next, each element in the preference set is taken its square root and the preference
pt(i,m) of joining the group built by the neighbor Xm becomes negative,
Pt(i) = { √pt(i, j), j ∈ Γt(i)}√
pt(i,m) = −
√
pt(i,m),m ∈ Γt(i)
(7)
Further, let Avet(i) = (∑ j∈Γt(i) √pt(i, j))/|Γt(i)|, thus, the updated preference set is,
Pt(i) = {pt(i, j), j ∈ Γt(i)}
pt(i, j) =
(
2 × Avet(i) −
√
pt(i, j)
)2 (8)
After the preference set of each player has been adjusted, an iteration of the model
is completed. In conclusion, when t ≥ 1, the network representing relationships among
players begins to evolve over time, which also makes a player’s strategy set and payoff
set become time-varying. Therefore, the game on evolving network Gt(X, Et, d) is
rewritten as Ω = {X,Gt, S t,Ut}.
Gt(X, Et, d) =

X(t) =
{
Xi(t), i = 1, 2, · · · , N
}
Γt(i) = Bi(̂ut−1(i))
Et =
⋃N
i=1 Et(i)
Et(i) =
{
et
(
Xi,X j
)
| j ∈ Γt(i)
}
S t =
{
st(i)
∣∣∣st(i) = Γt(i), i = 1, 2, · · · , N}
Ut =
{
ut(i)
∣∣∣ut(i) = ∑ j∈Γt(i) pt(i, j) × Degt( j)/d(Xi,X j), i = 1, 2, · · · , N}
(9)
As the model is iterated, some strategies are spread in the evolving network, which
are played by a great number of players. In other words, a certain strategy or several
strategies in the strategy set st(i) ∈ S t will be always played by the player Xi with the
maximal preference.
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Definition 6 If a player Xi ∈ X always or periodically chooses a strategy ŝt(i, j) ∈ st(i)
with the maximal preference max({pt(i, j), j ∈ Γt(i)}),

ŝt(i, j) = argmax
j∈Γt(i)
{
pt(i, j), j ∈ Γt(i)}
ŝt(i, j) = ŝt−1(i, j)
ŝt(i, j) = ŝt−nT (i, j)
(10)
then the strategy ŝt(i, j) ∈ st(i) is called the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of the
player Xi ∈ X. Here, the variable T is a constant period.
As a consequence, each player in the network will choose one of evolutionarily
stable strategies as his strategy and he is not willing to change his strategy unilaterally
during the iterations.
4 Algorithm and analysis
In this section, at first three different ERR functions (B1i (·), B2i (·), B3i (·)) are designed,
and then three clustering algorithms (EG1, EG2, EG3) based on them are established.
Finally, the clustering algorithm is elaborated and analyzed in detail.
4.1 Clustering algorithms
Assume an unlabeled dataset X = {X1,X2, · · · ,XN }, in which each instance consists
of m features. In the clustering algorithms, the relationships among all data points are
represented by a weighted and directed network Gt(X, Et, d), and each data point in the
dataset is considered as a player in the proposed model, who adjusts his strategy profile
in order to maximize his own payoff by observing other players’ payoffs in the union
Γt(i) ∪ Υt(i).
According to the proposed model, after a distance function d : X × X −→ R is
selected, the initial connections of data points, G0(X, E0, d), are constructed by means
of Definition 1. Then, the initial payoff set U0 of data points is computed step by
step. Finally, an ERR function is applied to explore in a neighborhood of each data
point, which changes neighbors in the neighbor set of the data point. Thus, a network
Gt(X, Et, d) will be evolving when t ≥ 1.
However, different ERR functions provide different exploring capacities for data
points, i.e., the observable areas of data points depend on an ERR function. As such,
there is no doubt that the obtained results vary when different ERR functions are em-
ployed. Here, three ERR functions (B1i (·), B2i (·), B3i (·)) are designed, and three cluster-
ing algorithms based on them are constructed respectively.
Algorithm EG1:
In Algorithm EG1, an ERR function B1i (·) that is realized most easily is used. This
function always observes an extended neighbor set formed by ⌈η × |Γt−1(i)|⌉ neighbors
of a data point Xi, where the symbol ⌈·⌉ is to take an integer part of a number satisfying
the integer part is no larger than the number, and the variable η is called a ratio of
exploration, η ∈ [0, 1]. According to Definition 4, a payoff threshold θ1t−1(i) is set by
θ1t−1(i) = f indα({ut−1( j), j ∈ Γt−1(i)}), α = ⌈(1− η)× |Γt−1(i)|⌉ firstly, where the function
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f indα(·) is to find the α-th largest payoff in the neighbor set Γt−1(i). As such, the set
Γt−1(i) is divided into two sets naturally:
Γ+t−1(i) =
{
j
∣∣∣ut−1( j) ≥ θ1t−1(i), j ∈ Γt−1(i)}, Γ−t−1(i) = Γt−1(i)\Γ+t−1(i) (11)
Then, based on the set Γ+t−1(i), the extended neighbor set is built,Υt−1(i) =
⋃
j∈Γ+t−1(i) Γt−1( j).
Further, the observable payoff set of the data point is written as,
ût−1(i) =
{
ut−1( j), j ∈ Γt−1(i) ∪ Υt−1(i)
}
(12)
At last, the ERR function B1i (·) is applied, which means that the edges connecting to
the neighbors with small payoffs are removed and new edges are created between the
data point and found players with larger payoffs. Hence, his new neighbor set is
Γt(i) = B1i (̂ut−1(i)) = argmaxkj∈Γt−1(i)∪Υt−1(i)
({
ut−1( j), j ∈ Γt−1(i) ∪ Υt−1(i)}) (13)
Algorithm EG2:
Unlike Algorithm EG1, the ERR function B2i (·) in Algorithm EG2 adjusts the num-
ber of neighbors dynamically to form an extended neighbor set instead of the constant
number of neighbors in Algorithm EG1. Furthermore, the payoff threshold θ2t−1(i) is set
by the average of neighbors’ payoffs, θ2t−1(i) =
∑
j∈Γt−1(i) ut−1( j)/|Γt−1(i)|. Next, the set
Γ+t−1(i) is formed, Γ+t−1(i) = { j|ut−1( j) ≥ θ2t−1(i), j ∈ Γt−1(i)}, and then the new neighbor
set is achieved by means of the ERR function B2i (·). In the case, when the payoffs of
all neighbors are equal to the payoff threshold θ2t−1(i), the output of the ERR function
is Γt(i) = B2i (̂ut−1(i)) = Γt−1(i). This may be viewed as self-protective behavior for
avoiding a payoff loss due to no enough information acquired.
Algorithm EG3:
The ERR function B3i (·) used in Algorithm EG3 provides more strongly exploring
capacities for the data points with small payoffs than that for those with larger payoffs.
Generally speaking, for maximizing their payoffs, players with small payoffs often
seems radical and show stronger desire for exploration, because this is the only way
to improve their payoffs. On the other hand, those players with large payoffs look
conservative for protecting their payoff gotten.
Formally, the ratio of exploration γ(i) of a data point Xi ∈ X is given as below:
γ(i) =
(max
j∈X
(ut−1( j)) + minj∈X (ut−1( j))) − ut−1(i)
max
j∈X
(
ut−1( j)) (14)
Thus, the data point Xi ∈ X can observe an extended neighbor set that is formed by
⌈γ(i)×|Γt−1(i)|⌉ neighbors. Further, the payoff threshold is set by θ3t−1(i) = f indβ(i)({ut−1( j), j ∈
Γt−1(i)}), β(i) = ⌈(1 − γ(i)) × |Γt−1(i)|⌉ and then the new neighbor set Γt(i) is built ac-
cording to the ERR function B3i (·).
The ERR function brings about changes of the connections among data points, so
that the preferences need to be adjusted in terms of Definition 5. When the evolution-
arily stable strategies appear in the network, the clustering algorithm exits. In the end,
the data points using the same evolutionarily stable strategy are gathered together as
a cluster, and the number of evolutionarily stable strategies indicates the number of
clusters.
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4.2 Analysis of algorithm
The process of data clustering in the proposed algorithm can be viewed an explanation
about the group formation in society. Initially, each data point (a player) in the dataset
establishes a group which corresponds to an initial cluster at the same time that he joins
other groups built by k other players. As such, the preference p(i, j) may be explained
as the level of participation; Deg(i) represents the total number of players in a group;
1/d(Xi,X j) denotes the position that the player occupies in a group in order to identify
a player is a president or an average member, and a player Xi usually occupies the
highest position in his own group; the total payoff u(i) of a player Xi is viewed as the
attraction of a group. According to Definition 3, the reward of a player Xi is associated
directly with the preference, the total number of players and his position in a group. If
a player Xi who occupies an important position joins a group with maximal preference,
and the number of players in the group is considerable, then the reward R(i, j) that the
player receives is also large. On the other hand, for a player Xh who is an average
member in the same group, i.e., 1/d(Xi,X j) > 1/d(Xh,X j), although his preference to
join this group is as same as that of the player Xi, p(i, j) = p(h, j), his reward acquired
from this group is smaller than that of the player Xi by means of Eq. 3. This seems
unfair, but it is consistent with the phenomena observed in society. In addition, the total
payoff ut(i) of the player Xi is the sum of his all rewards, ut(i) = ∑ j∈Γt(i) R(i, j).
Certainly, each player is willing to join a group with large attraction, and quit a
group with little attraction, as is done by an ERR function. Next, the player finds the
group with the largest attraction and increases the level of participation, namely the
preference pt(i, j) at the same time that other preferences are decreased. To adjust
the preference set Pt(i) of a player Xi, the Grover iteration G in the quantum search
algorithm [28], a well-known algorithm in quantum computation[29], is employed,
which is a way to adjust the probability amplitude of each term in a superposition
state. By adjustment, the probability amplitude of the wanted is increased, while the
others are reduced. This whole process may be regarded as the inversion about average
operation [28]. For our case, each element in the preference set needs to be taken its
square root first, and then the average Avet(i) of all square roots is obtained. Finally,
all values are inverted about the average. There are three main reasons that we select
the modified Grover iteration as the updating method of preferences: (a) the sum of
preferences updated retains one, ∑ j∈Γt(i) pt(i, j) = 1, (b) a certain preference updated in
a player’s preference set is much larger than the others, pt(i, j) ≫ pt(i, h), h ∈ Γt(i)\ j,
and (c) it helps players’ payoffs to be a power law distribution, in which only a few
players’ payoffs are far larger than others’ after iterations. Moreover, this is consistent
with our observations in society, i.e., a player will change the level of participation
obviously after he takes part in activities held by neighbors’ groups. In other words,
for the group with large attraction he shows higher level of participation, whereas he
hardly joins those groups with little attraction.
After the model is iterated several times, a player Xi ∈ X will find the most attrac-
tive group for him, and join this group with the largest preference, max({pt(i, j), j ∈
Γt(i)}). Hence, only a few groups are so attractive that almost all players join them. On
the other hand, most of groups are closed due to a lack of players. Those lucky survivals
not only attract many players but also those players in the groups show the highest level
of participation. Furthermore, these surviving groups are the clusters formed by players
(data points) automatically, where the players (data points) in a cluster play the same
evolutionarily stable strategies, and the number of surviving groups is also the number
of clusters.
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5 Experiments and Discussions
To evaluate these three clustering algorithms, five datasets are selected from UCI repos-
itory [30], which are Soybean, Iris, Wine, Ionosphere and Breast cancer Wisconsin
datasets, and experiments are performed on them.
5.1 Experiments
In this subsection, firstly these datasets are introduced briefly, and then the experimental
results are demonstrated. The original data points in above datasets all are scattered in
high dimensional spaces spanned by their features, where the description of all datasets
is summarized in Table 1. As for Breast dataset, some lost features are replaced by
random numbers, and the Wine dataset is standardized. Finally, this algorithm is coded
in Matlab 6.5.
Table 1: Description of datasets.
Dataset Instances Features classes
Soybean 47 21 4
Iris 150 4 3
Wine 178 13 3
Ionosphere 351 32 2
Breast 699 9 2
Throughout all experiments, data points in a dataset are considered as players in
games whose initial positions are taken from the dataset. Next, the network represent-
ing initial relationships among data points are created according to Definition 1, after a
distance function is selected. This distance function only needs to satisfy the condition
that the more similar data points are, the smaller the output of the function is. In the
experiments, the distance function applied is as following:
d(Xi,X j) = exp(‖Xi − X j‖/2σ2), i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N (15)
where the symbol ‖ · ‖ represents L2-norm. The advantage of this function is that it
not only satisfies above requirements, but also overcomes the drawbacks of Euclidean
distance. For instance, when two points are very close, the output of Euclidean distance
function approaches zero, as may make the computation of payoff fail due to the payoff
approaching infinite. Nevertheless, when Eq.(15) is selected as the distance function,
it is more convenient to compute the players’ payoffs, since its minimum is one and the
reciprocals of its output are between zero and one, 1/d(Xi,X j) ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, the
parameter σ in Eq.(15) takes one and the distance between a data point and itself is set
by d(Xi,Xi) = 1. As is analyzed in 4.2, a data point Xi occupies the highest position in
the group established by himself.
Three clustering algorithms are applied on the five datasets respectively. Because
the capacity of exploration of an ERR function depends in part on the number k of
nearest neighbors, the algorithms are run on every dataset at different numbers of near-
est neighbors. Those clustering results obtained by three algorithms are compared in
Fig. 1, in which each point represents a clustering accuracy. The clustering accuracy is
defined as below:
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Definition 7 csti is the label which is assigned to a data point Xi in a dataset by the
algorithm, and ci is the actual label of the data point Xi in the dataset. So the clustering
accuracy is [31]:
accuracy =
∑n
i=1 λ(map(csti), ci)/n
λ(map(csti), ci) =

1 if map(csti) = ci
0 otherwise
(16)
where the mapping function map(·) maps the label got by the algorithm to the actual
label.
As is shown in Fig. 1, the clustering results obtained by Algorithm EG1 and EG2
are similar at different numbers of nearest neighbors. As a whole, the results of Algo-
rithm EG1 are a bit better than that of Algorithm EG2 owing to the stronger capacity
of exploration. However, for the same dataset the best result is achieved by Algorithm
EG3, which shows the strongest capacity of exploration. As analyzed above, both the
strongest capacity of exploration and the stable results cannot be achieved at the same
time, so a trade-off is needed between them.
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Figure 1: Comparison of clustering accuracies in Algorithm EG1, EG2, and EG3.
We compare our results to those results obtained by other clustering algorithms,
Kmeans [32], PCA-Kmeans [32], LDA-Km [32], on the same dataset. The comparison
is summarized in Table 2.
5.2 Discussions
In the subsection, firstly, we discuss how the number of clusters is affected by the num-
ber k of nearest neighbors changing. Then, for the Algorithm EG1, the relationships
between the ratio of exploration and the clustering results is investigated, which pro-
vides a way to select the ratio of exploration η. Finally, the rates of convergence in
three clustering algorithms are compared.
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Table 2: Comparison of clustering accuracies of algorithm.
Algorithm Soybean Iris Wine Ionosphere Breast
EG1 95.75% 90% 96.63% 74.64% 94.99%
EG2 91.49% 90.67% 96.07% 74.64% 95.14%
EG3 97.87% 90.67% 97.19% 74.64% 94.99%
Kmeans 68.1% 89.3% 70.2% 71% –
PCA-Kmeans 72.3% 88.7% 70.2% 71% –
LDA-Km 76.6% 98% 82.6% 71.2% –
5.2.1 Number of nearest neighbors vs. number of clusters
The number k of nearest neighbors represents the number of neighbors to which a data
point Xi ∈ X connects. For a dataset, the number k of nearest neighbors determines
the number of clusters in part. Generally speaking, the number of clusters decreases
inversely with the number k of nearest neighbors. If the number k of nearest neighbors
is small, which indicates a data point Xi connects to a few neighbors, in this case the
area that the ERR function may explore is also small, i.e., the elements in the union of
the extended neighbor set Υt−1(i) and the neighbor set Γt−1(i) are only a few. Therefore,
when the network evolves over time, strategies are spread only in a small area. Finally
many small clusters with evolutionarily stable strategies appear in the network. On the
other hand, a big number k of nearest neighbors provides more neighbors for a data
point, which implies that the cardinality of the union is larger than that when a small
k is employed. This also means that a larger area can be observed and explored by
the ERR function, so that big clusters containing more data points are formed because
evolutionarily stable strategies are spread in larger areas.
For a dataset, the clustering results in different number k of nearest neighbors have
been illustrated in Fig. 2, in which each data point only connects to the neighbor with
the largest preference, and clusters are represented by different signs. As is shown
in Fig. 2, we can find that only a few data points receive considerable connections,
whereas most of data points have only one connection. This indicates that when the
evolution of network is ended, the network formed is characterized by the scale-free
network [33], i.e., winner takes all. Besides, in Fig. 2(a), six clusters are obtained by
the clustering algorithm, when k = 8. As the number k of nearest neighbors rises, five
clusters are obtained when k = 10, three clusters when k = 15. So, if the exact number
of clusters is not known in advance, different number of clusters may be achieved by
adjusting the number of nearest neighbors in practice.
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
(a) k = 8
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
(b) k = 10
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
(c) k = 15
Figure 2: The number of nearest neighbors vs. number of clusters.
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5.2.2 Effect of the ratio of exploration in Algorithm EG1
For the ERR function B1i (·) used in Algorithm EG1, its capacity of exploration may be
adjusted by setting different ratio of exploration η ∈ [0, 1]. If the ratio of exploration
is η = 0, then the extended neighbor set formed will be empty. Hence, the network
does not evolve over time, since the ERR function does not explore. On the other
hand, when the ratio of exploration takes the maximum η = 1, the ERR function is
with the strongest capacity of exploration, because an extended neighbor set formed
by all neighbors can be observed. Then we may ask naturally: what should the ratio
of exploration be taken? To answer this question, we compare those clustering results
at different η shown in Fig. 3, in which the results are represented by the clustering
accuracies.
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Figure 3: The results of algorithm EG1 at different rates of exploration.
From Fig. 3, we can see that when the ratio of exploration is greater than 0.5,
the clustering results obtained by Algorithms EG1 fluctuates strongly, as seems over
exploration. On the contrary, in the case when η ≤ 0.5, the clustering results are
stable relatively. As a whole, when the ratio of exploration η = 0.5, the best results
are achieved in Algorithm EG1. In conclusion, a big ratio of exploration is not too
good, because it may cause the ERR function B1i (·) over exploration. However, if the
ratio of exploration is too small, good results are not obtained because of a lack of
exploration. Therefore, in the later discussion, the ratio of exploration in Algorithm
EG1 takes η = 0.5.
5.2.3 Three ERR functions vs. rate of convergence
As for Algorithm EG1, when η = 0.5, the ERR function B1i (·) may observe the extended
neighbor set formed by half of neighbors. In this case, the payoff threshold is θ1t−1(i) =
median({ut−1( j), j ∈ Γt−1(i)}). In Algorithm EG2, however, the ERR function B2i (·) only
can observe the extended neighbor set formed by neighbors whose payoffs are greater
than the average θ2t−1(i). Generally speaking, for the same k, the median of payoffs is
smaller than or equal to the mean, i.e., θ1t−1(i) ≤ θ2t−1(i). So the exploring area of the
ERR function B1i (·) is larger than that of the ERR function B2i (·), that is, the number of
edges rewired in Algorithm EG1 is more than that in Algorithm EG2. In addition, the
number of edges rewired in Algorithm EG3 is largest, since in Algorithm EG3 the ERR
function B3i (·) provides stronger capacity of exploration for players with small payoffs,
which makes more edges are removed and rewired. The comparison of number of
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edges rewired in three algorithms is illustrated in Fig. 4. As is shown in Fig. 4, at
different number of nearest neighbors, the number of edges rewired in Algorithm EG3
is larger than that in other two, and the number of edges rewired in Algorithm EG1
is larger than Algorithm EG2. For each one of three algorithms, the number of edges
rewired increases rapidly with the number of nearest neighbors.
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Figure 4: The number of edges rewired or rates of convergence of three algorithms.
Besides, the number of iterations indicates the rate of convergence of an algorithm.
From Fig. 4, we can see that the rates of convergence in Algorithm EG1 and EG2 are
almost the same, and the rate of Algorithm EG3 is slower slightly than the other two
because the ERR function B3i (·) in Algorithm EG3 explores larger areas than that in
Algorithm EG1 and EG2. For each one of three algorithms, as the number of nearest
neighbors rises, the number of iterations also rises slightly.
When the algorithm converges, the evolutionarily stable strategies appear in the
network at the same time. The changes of the strategies with the largest preference
for each data point are shown in Fig. 5, where the straight lines in the right side of
figures represent the evolutionarily stable strategies, and the number of straight lines
is the number of clusters. As is shown in Fig. 5, the evolutionarily stable strategies
appear in the network after only a few iterations, as indicates the rates of convergence
of algorithms are fast enough.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
number of iterations
st
ra
te
gy
 w
ith
 th
e 
la
rg
es
t p
re
fe
re
nc
e
(a) EG1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
number of iterations
st
ra
te
gy
 w
ith
 th
e 
la
rg
es
t p
re
fe
re
nc
e
(b) EG2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
number of iterations
st
ra
te
gy
 w
ith
 th
e 
la
rg
es
t p
re
fe
re
nc
e
(c) EG3
Figure 5: Evolutions of strategies with the largest preference and evolutionarily stable
strategies.
6 Conclusion
A model based upon games on an evolving network has been established, which may
be used to explain the formation of groups in society partly. Following this model,
three clustering algorithms (EG1, EG2 and EG3) using three different ERR functions
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are constructed, in which each data point in a dataset is regarded as a player in a game.
When a distance function is selected, the initial network is created among data points
according to Definition 1. Then, by applying an ERR function, the network will evolve
over time due to edges removed and rewired. Hence, the preference set of a player
needs to be adjusted in terms of Definition 5, and payoffs of players are recomputed
too. During the network evolving, certain strategies are spread in the network. Finally,
the evolutionarily stable strategies emerge in the network. According to evolutionarily
stable strategies played by players, those data points with the same evolutionarily stable
strategies are collected as a cluster. As such, the clustering results are obtained, where
the number of evolutionarily stable strategies corresponds to the number of clusters.
The ERR functions (B1i (·), B2i (·), B3i (·)) employed in three clustering algorithms pro-
vide different capacities of exploration for these clustering algorithms, i.e., the sizes of
areas which they can observe are various. So, the clustering results of three algorithms
are different. For the ERR function B1i (·), it is with a constant ratio of exploration
η = 0.5 because over exploration may occur when η > 0.5, and can observe an ex-
tend neighbor set formed by half of neighbors. The ERR function B2i (·), however, can
observe an extend neighbor set formed by neighbors whose payoffs are larger than the
average, while the ERR function B3i (·) provides stronger capacity of exploration for
data points with small payoffs. Besides, the clustering results of Algorithm EG1 and
EG2 are more stable than that of Algorithm EG3, but the best results are achieved by
Algorithm EG3 due to the strongest capacity of exploration among three algorithms.
In the case when the exact number of clusters is unknown in advance, one can adjust
the number k of nearest neighbors to control the number of clusters, where the number
of clusters decreases inversely with the number k of nearest neighbors. We evaluate
the clustering algorithms on five real datasets, experimental results have demonstrated
that data points in a dataset are clustered reasonably and efficiently, and the rates of
convergence of three algorithms are fast enough.
References
[1] J. MacQueen, Some methods for classification and analysis of multivariate obser-
vations, in: Proceedings of Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statis-
tics and Probability, Vol. 1, Statistical Laboratory of the University of California,
Berkeley, 1967, pp. 281–297.
[2] J. R. Quinlan, C4.5: programs for machine learning, Morgan Kaufmann Publish-
ers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA, 1993.
[3] A. Ben-Hur, D. Horn, H. T. Siegelmann, V. Vapnik, Support vector clustering,
Journal of Machine Learning Research (2) (2001) 125–137.
[4] A. Y. Ng, M. I. Jordan, Y. Weiss, On spectral clustering: Analysis and an algo-
rithm, in: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 14, MIT Press,
2002, pp. 849–856.
[5] M. B. H. Rhouma, H. Frigui, Self-organization of pulse-coupled oscillators with
application to clustering, IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 23 (2) (2001)
180–195.
[6] G. Folino, G. Spezzano, An adaptive flocking algorithm for spatial clustering, in:
Parallel Problem Solving from Nature ł PPSN VII, 2002, pp. 924–933.
15
[7] D. W. van der Merwe, A. P. Engelbrecht, Data clustering using particle swarm
optimization, in: A. P. Engelbrecht (Ed.), Proceedings of IEEE Congress on Evo-
lutionary Computation (CEC2003), Vol. 1, Canberra, Australia, 2003, pp. 215–
220.
[8] N. Labroche, N. Monmarche´, G. Venturini, Antclust: Ant clustering and web
usage mining, in: Genetic and Evolutionary Computation ł GECCO 2003, Vol.
2723, Chicago, IL, USA, 2003, pp. 201–201.
[9] X. Cui, J. Gao, T. E. Potok, A flocking based algorithm for document clustering
analysis, Journal of Systems Architecture 52 (8-9) (2006) 505–515.
[10] J. v. Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1944.
[11] J. Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 36 (1950) 48–49.
[12] J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, The Annals of Mathematics 54 (2) (1951) 286–
295.
[13] J. M. Smith, Evolution and the theory of games, American Scientist 64 (1) (1976)
41–45.
[14] J. M. Smith, G. R. Price, The logic of animal conflict, Nature 246 (5427) (1973)
15–18.
[15] P. Pettit, R. Sugden, The backward induction paradox, The Journal of Philosophy
86 (4) (1989) 169–182.
[16] H. A. Simon, Models of My Life, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996.
[17] G. Szabo´, G. Fath, Evolutionary games on graphs, Physics Reports-Review Sec-
tion of Physics Letters 446 (4-6) (2007) 97–216.
[18] J. W. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995.
[19] M. Broom, C. Cannings, G. Vickers, Evolution in knockout conflicts: The fixed
strategy case, Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 62 (3) (2000) 451–466.
[20] J. Hofbauer, K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
[21] R. Axelrod, W. D. Hamilton, The evolution of cooperation, Science 211 (4489)
(1981) 1390–1396.
[22] M. A. Nowak, R. M. May, The spatial dilemmas of evolution, International Jour-
nal of Bifurcation and Chaos 3 (1) (1993) 35–78.
[23] G. Szabo´, C. Toke, Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice,
Physical Review E 58 (1) (1998) 69–73.
[24] M. Perc, A. Szolnoki, Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial
prisoner’s dilemma game, Physical Review E (Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft
Matter Physics) 77 (1) (2008) 011904.
16
[25] J. Vukov, G. Szabo´, Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on hierarchical lat-
tices, Physical Review E (Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics) 71 (3)
(2005) 036133.
[26] M. Doebeli, C. Hauert, Models of cooperation based on the prisoner’s dilemma
and the snowdrift game, Ecology Letter 8 (7) (2005) 748–766.
[27] M. A. Nowak, Five rules for the evolution of cooperation, Science 314 (5805)
(2006) 1560–1563.
[28] L. K. Grover, Quantum mechanics helps in searching for a needle in a haystack,
Physical Review Letters 79 (2) (1997) 325.
[29] M. A. Nielsen, I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
[30] C. Blake, C. Merz, UCI Repository of machine learning databases, Department
of ICS, University of California, Irvine., http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/, 1998.
[31] G. Erkan, Language model-based document clustering using random walks, in:
Proceedings of the main conference on Human Language Technology Conference
of the North American Chapter of the Association of Computational Linguistics,
Association for Computational Linguistics, New York, New York, 2006.
[32] C. Ding, T. Li, Adaptive dimension reduction using discriminant analysis and
k-means clustering, in: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Ma-
chine Learning, Corvallis, OR, 2007, pp. 521–528.
[33] A.-L. Baraba´si, E. Bonabeau, Scale-free networks, Scientific American 288 (5)
(2003) 60–69.
17
